mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00009553.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "12",
    "document_number": "620",
    "date": "02/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 12 of 21\n\ninsufficient basis for an evidentiary hearing, especially one that, according to the Defendant, would require the Court to \"haul [11] jurors in after they have reached a verdict\" to probe for who, if anyone, may have been mentioned in the article. Guzman Loera, 24 F.4th at 161 (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234).\n\nSecond, Federal Rule of Evidence 606 bars the Court from considering Juror 50's statements as evidence of another juror's statements purportedly made during deliberations. As previously quoted, the rule states:\n\nDuring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters.\n\nFed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1).\n\nRule 606(b) is subject to three enumerated exceptions that permit a juror to testify about whether (A) \"extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention\"; (B) \"an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror\"; or (C) \"a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.\" Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2). In addition to these exceptions enumerated in the rule, the Supreme Court has held that Rule 606 \"give[s] way\" where \"a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.\" Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017). Absent one of these circumstances, evidence within the ambit of Rule 606 may not be considered.\n\nHere, the Defendant relies on Juror 50's statements of what another juror allegedly stated during deliberations. That proffer is barred by Rule 606.\n\nIn response, the Defendant argues that Juror 50's statements about the second juror fall outside the scope of Rule 606 because she \"does not seek to impeach the verdict based on the\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009553",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 12 of 21",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "insufficient basis for an evidentiary hearing, especially one that, according to the Defendant, would require the Court to \"haul [11] jurors in after they have reached a verdict\" to probe for who, if anyone, may have been mentioned in the article. Guzman Loera, 24 F.4th at 161 (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234).\n\nSecond, Federal Rule of Evidence 606 bars the Court from considering Juror 50's statements as evidence of another juror's statements purportedly made during deliberations. As previously quoted, the rule states:\n\nDuring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters.\n\nFed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1).\n\nRule 606(b) is subject to three enumerated exceptions that permit a juror to testify about whether (A) \"extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention\"; (B) \"an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror\"; or (C) \"a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.\" Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2). In addition to these exceptions enumerated in the rule, the Supreme Court has held that Rule 606 \"give[s] way\" where \"a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.\" Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017). Absent one of these circumstances, evidence within the ambit of Rule 606 may not be considered.\n\nHere, the Defendant relies on Juror 50's statements of what another juror allegedly stated during deliberations. That proffer is barred by Rule 606.\n\nIn response, the Defendant argues that Juror 50's statements about the second juror fall outside the scope of Rule 606 because she \"does not seek to impeach the verdict based on the",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009553",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Guzman Loera",
      "Pena-Rodriguez"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Colorado"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/25/22",
      "2017"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 620",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009553"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}