mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00009556.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "15",
    "document_number": "620",
    "date": "02/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 15 of 21\n\njudge, court personnel, and counsel; observations by other jurors, who “may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict”; and “impeach[ment] [of] the verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct.” 483 U.S. at 127; see also Warger, 574 U.S. at 51 (“[A] party’s right to an impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)’s removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased.”). The Defendant cites in support the Supreme Court’s decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, but that case is unavailing to her position. There, the Supreme Court held that “where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” 137 S. Ct. at 869. Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court took great care to hold that the “unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns” intrinsic to a juror with racial animus do not attach to other forms of juror misconduct. Id. at 868. In fact, it expressly contrasted the case of a juror with racial animus to a juror that “ha[s] a personal experience that improperly influences her consideration of the case,” as was at issue in Warger v. Shauers and as is alleged here. Id. at 869.\n\nThird, even if the Court did consider Juror 50’s statements about what another juror said during deliberations—which Rule 606 prohibits—the statements proffered by the Defendant do not meet the threshold of “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred.” Baker, 899 F.3d at 130. According to an article in the Daily Mail, Juror 50 “revealed that he was not the only juror to share a story of sexual abuse.” That sentence summarizes an unsworn and non-specific statement, which does not identify the alleged misconduct or the juror in question with any particularity. It therefore falls\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009556",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 15 of 21",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "judge, court personnel, and counsel; observations by other jurors, who “may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict”; and “impeach[ment] [of] the verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct.” 483 U.S. at 127; see also Warger, 574 U.S. at 51 (“[A] party’s right to an impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)’s removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased.”). The Defendant cites in support the Supreme Court’s decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, but that case is unavailing to her position. There, the Supreme Court held that “where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” 137 S. Ct. at 869. Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court took great care to hold that the “unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns” intrinsic to a juror with racial animus do not attach to other forms of juror misconduct. Id. at 868. In fact, it expressly contrasted the case of a juror with racial animus to a juror that “ha[s] a personal experience that improperly influences her consideration of the case,” as was at issue in Warger v. Shauers and as is alleged here. Id. at 869.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Third, even if the Court did consider Juror 50’s statements about what another juror said during deliberations—which Rule 606 prohibits—the statements proffered by the Defendant do not meet the threshold of “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred.” Baker, 899 F.3d at 130. According to an article in the Daily Mail, Juror 50 “revealed that he was not the only juror to share a story of sexual abuse.” That sentence summarizes an unsworn and non-specific statement, which does not identify the alleged misconduct or the juror in question with any particularity. It therefore falls",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "15",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009556",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Colorado"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/25/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 620",
      "483 U.S. at 127",
      "574 U.S. at 51",
      "137 S. Ct. at 869",
      "899 F.3d at 130",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009556"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 15 of 21."
}