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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "24 of 51",
- "document_number": "621",
- "date": "02/25/22",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 24 of 51\nis all that is required. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 622 (2d Cir. 2003). And in any event, Jane recalled the incident of abuse at least as early as November 3, 2021. (See Def. Mot. at 5 n.1 (citing 3509-033 at 1)). Notes from that interview were provided to the defense on November 6, 2021—more than three weeks before trial. At the time, the parties were still litigating whether Kate could testify at all. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 417 (order dated November 6, 2021, requiring the Government to brief whether Kate was a “victim” for any legal purpose, including restitution)). The Court did not permit Kate to testify until November 19, 2021—almost two weeks after the defendant received the relevant notes. (Dkt. No. 477). And following that decision, the parties continued to litigate the limiting instructions for Kate and Annie in advance of trial. (See, e.g., 11/23/21 Tr. at 28-38). Accordingly, the defendant had ample notice to seek a limiting instruction as to this portion of Jane’s testimony. See Lebedev, 932 F.3d at 54 (“rejecting a prejudice argument in part because ‘[t]he government disclosed the evidence and exhibits . . . four weeks prior to trial’’). The Court’s failure to give one sua sponte is not a prejudicial variance. The defendant is simply characterizing her failure to ask for a limiting instruction at the time of Jane’s testimony as an argument that she was prejudiced. To the contrary, the Court did not err—much less plainly so. See United States v. Petit, 19 Cr. 850 (JSR), 2021 WL 673461, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2021) (applying the plain error standard to a constructive amendment claim in a Rule 33 motion that was not made at trial). Finally, even if the defendant had been entitled to a limiting instruction but was deprived of the opportunity to request it, she still was not prejudiced. As the Court agreed at the charge conference, although the Court gave the limiting instructions for Annie and Kate, there was no 23 DOJ-OGR-00009586",
- "text_blocks": [
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 24 of 51",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "is all that is required. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 622 (2d Cir. 2003). And in any event, Jane recalled the incident of abuse at least as early as November 3, 2021. (See Def. Mot. at 5 n.1 (citing 3509-033 at 1)). Notes from that interview were provided to the defense on November 6, 2021—more than three weeks before trial. At the time, the parties were still litigating whether Kate could testify at all. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 417 (order dated November 6, 2021, requiring the Government to brief whether Kate was a “victim” for any legal purpose, including restitution)). The Court did not permit Kate to testify until November 19, 2021—almost two weeks after the defendant received the relevant notes. (Dkt. No. 477). And following that decision, the parties continued to litigate the limiting instructions for Kate and Annie in advance of trial. (See, e.g., 11/23/21 Tr. at 28-38). Accordingly, the defendant had ample notice to seek a limiting instruction as to this portion of Jane’s testimony. See Lebedev, 932 F.3d at 54 (“rejecting a prejudice argument in part because ‘[t]he government disclosed the evidence and exhibits . . . four weeks prior to trial’’). The Court’s failure to give one sua sponte is not a prejudicial variance. The defendant is simply characterizing her failure to ask for a limiting instruction at the time of Jane’s testimony as an argument that she was prejudiced. To the contrary, the Court did not err—much less plainly so. See United States v. Petit, 19 Cr. 850 (JSR), 2021 WL 673461, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2021) (applying the plain error standard to a constructive amendment claim in a Rule 33 motion that was not made at trial). Finally, even if the defendant had been entitled to a limiting instruction but was deprived of the opportunity to request it, she still was not prejudiced. As the Court agreed at the charge conference, although the Court gave the limiting instructions for Annie and Kate, there was no",
- "position": "main content"
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "23",
- "position": "footer"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009586",
- "position": "footer"
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- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Jane",
- "Kate",
- "Annie"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Government",
- "Court"
- ],
- "locations": [
- "S.D.N.Y."
- ],
- "dates": [
- "November 3, 2021",
- "November 6, 2021",
- "November 19, 2021",
- "February 21, 2021",
- "02/25/22"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "621",
- "417",
- "477",
- "19 Cr. 850 (JSR)",
- "3509-033",
- "DOJ-OGR-00009586"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 24 of 51."
- }
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