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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "164",
- "document_number": "204",
- "date": "04/16/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "statements at the heart of that case and the evidence that might have been uncovered had the defendant answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in context to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore should deny the motion.\n\nIn any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, the questions were aimed at developing a record in the civil suit that Epstein and the defendant recruited Giuffre to Epstein's Palm Beach property in the guise of hiring her as a masseuse, and then sexualized that massage. Honest answers to those questions—for instance that Epstein in fact had a scheme to recruit underaged girls for sexual massages—would have been corroborative of some of Giuffre's claims. Second, had the defendant honestly answered the deposition questions, Giuffre could have located other victims or witnesses who may have corroborated her testimony. But in any event, the question of materiality should be put to the jury and is inappropriate for the Court to resolve on a motion to dismiss without the benefit of the full factual record. The motion should be denied.\n\nallegations that were central to the dispute in Giuffre v. Maxwell.\" (Def. Mot. 4, Ex. I at 7:3-6.) (The last colloquy has been unsealed except for Minor Victim-2's name. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1212-1).) Yet Judge Preska's opinion as to the propriety of certain redactions in a civil case is not controlling as to whether the Government can meet the elements of a criminal perjury charge here. First, before Judge Preska were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity to be heard on this issue before Judge Preska.\n\n51 While the Government is open to crafting a stipulation on the background of the Giuffre lawsuit to streamline presentation of these issues to the jury, it notes that the defendant's summary of that suit as set forth in her motion is incorrect. (E.g., Def. Mot. 4 at 20 (erroneously asserting that the defamation claims at issue turned on Giuffre's ability to prove salacious allegations about public officials)).\n\n137",
- "text_blocks": [
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "statements at the heart of that case and the evidence that might have been uncovered had the defendant answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in context to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore should deny the motion.",
- "position": "top"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "In any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, the questions were aimed at developing a record in the civil suit that Epstein and the defendant recruited Giuffre to Epstein's Palm Beach property in the guise of hiring her as a masseuse, and then sexualized that massage. Honest answers to those questions—for instance that Epstein in fact Had a scheme to recruit underaged girls for sexual massages—would have been corroborative of some of Giuffre's claims. Second, had the defendant honestly answered the deposition questions, Giuffre could have located other victims or witnesses who may have corroborated her testimony. But in any event, the question of materiality should be put to the jury and is inappropriate for the Court to resolve on a motion to dismiss without the benefit of the full factual record. The motion should be denied.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "allegations that were central to the dispute in Giuffre v. Maxwell.\" (Def. Mot. 4, Ex. I at 7:3-6.) (The last colloquy has been unsealed except for Minor Victim-2's name. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1212-1).) Yet Judge Preska's opinion as to the propriety of certain redactions in a civil case is not controlling as to whether the Government can meet the elements of a criminal perjury charge here. First, before Judge Preska were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity to be heard on this issue before Judge Preska.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "51 While the Government is open to crafting a stipulation on the background of the Giuffre lawsuit to streamline presentation of these issues to the jury, it notes that the defendant's summary of that suit as set forth in her motion is incorrect. (E.g., Def. Mot. 4 at 20 (erroneously asserting that the defamation claims at issue turned on Giuffre's ability to prove salacious allegations about public officials)).",
- "position": "bottom"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "137",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Giuffre",
- "Epstein",
- "Maxwell",
- "Judge Preska",
- "Judge Sweet",
- "Minor Victim-2"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Government"
- ],
- "locations": [
- "Palm Beach"
- ],
- "dates": [
- "04/16/21"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 204",
- "15 Civ. 7433 (LAP)",
- "Dkt. No. 1212-1"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal perjury case involving the defendant and allegations related to Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell. The text discusses the materiality of the defendant's statements in a deposition and the relevance of a civil case (Giuffre v. Maxwell) to the criminal proceedings."
- }
|