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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "45",
- "document_number": "310-1",
- "date": "07/02/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
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- "full_text": "court . . . .\" Id. (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b)). Because no such order existed here, the Superior Court concluded that it could \"ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that [Cosby] was not immune from prosecution, because Mr. Castor failed to seek or obtain an immunity order pursuant to Section 5947.\" Id. at 412. \"Only a court order conveying such immunity is legally binding in this Commonwealth.\" Id.\n\nThe Superior Court further rejected Cosby's invocation of promissory estoppel asserting reliance upon D.A. Castor's assurances, as demonstrated by Cosby's cooperation with Constand's civil suit and his decision not to invoke the Fifth Amendment during his deposition testimony. The panel opined that Cosby failed to cite sufficient authority to establish that a prosecution may be barred under a promissory estoppel theory. The panel further agreed with the trial court that, in any event, \"it was not reasonable for [Cosby] to rely on Mr. Castor's promise, even if the trial court had found credible the testimony provided by Mr. Castor and [Cosby's] civil attorney,\" Attorney Schmitt. Id. The panel stated: \"We cannot deem reasonable [Cosby's] reliance on such a promise when he was represented by counsel, especially when immunity can only be granted by a court order, and where no court order granting him immunity existed.\" Id. at 413.\n\nThe Superior Court further opined that there was \"virtually no evidence in the record that [Cosby] actually declined to assert his Fifth Amendment rights at the civil deposition based on Mr. Castor's purported promise not to prosecute.\" Id. Although the court noted that Attorney Schmitt was the only witness who could testify that Cosby indeed relied upon Castor's purported promise during his deposition (Attorney Schmitt did so testify), it emphasized the Commonwealth's argument that Attorney Schmitt allowed Cosby to give a statement to the police during the initial investigation, that Cosby did not incriminate himself at that point, that Attorney Schmitt further negotiated with the",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "court . . . .\" Id. (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b)). Because no such order existed here, the Superior Court concluded that it could \"ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that [Cosby] was not immune from prosecution, because Mr. Castor failed to seek or obtain an immunity order pursuant to Section 5947.\" Id. at 412. \"Only a court order conveying such immunity is legally binding in this Commonwealth.\" Id.",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "The Superior Court further rejected Cosby's invocation of promissory estoppel asserting reliance upon D.A. Castor's assurances, as demonstrated by Cosby's cooperation with Constand's civil suit and his decision not to invoke the Fifth Amendment during his deposition testimony. The panel opined that Cosby failed to cite sufficient authority to establish that a prosecution may be barred under a promissory estoppel theory. The panel further agreed with the trial court that, in any event, \"it was not reasonable for [Cosby] to rely on Mr. Castor's promise, even if the trial court had found credible the testimony provided by Mr. Castor and [Cosby's] civil attorney,\" Attorney Schmitt. Id. The panel stated: \"We cannot deem reasonable [Cosby's] reliance on such a promise when he was represented by counsel, especially when immunity can only be granted by a court order, and where no court order granting him immunity existed.\" Id. at 413.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "The Superior Court further opined that there was \"virtually no evidence in the record that [Cosby] actually declined to assert his Fifth Amendment rights at the civil deposition based on Mr. Castor's purported promise not to prosecute.\" Id. Although the court noted that Attorney Schmitt was the only witness who could testify that Cosby indeed relied upon Castor's purported promise during his deposition (Attorney Schmitt did so testify), it emphasized the Commonwealth's argument that Attorney Schmitt allowed Cosby to give a statement to the police during the initial investigation, that Cosby did not incriminate himself at that point, that Attorney Schmitt further negotiated with the",
- "position": "bottom"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "[J-100-2020] - 44",
- "position": "footer"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004857",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Cosby",
- "Castor",
- "Constand",
- "Schmitt"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Superior Court",
- "Commonwealth"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "07/02/21"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "310-1",
- "J-100-2020",
- "DOJ-OGR-00004857"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Bill Cosby. The text discusses the Superior Court's decision regarding Cosby's invocation of promissory estoppel and the trial court's determination that Cosby was not immune from prosecution. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
- }
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