mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00000346.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "11-1",
    "date": "July 8, 2019",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11-1 Filed 07/12/19 Page 4 of 10\n\nHonorable Henry Pitman\nUnited States Magistrate Judge\nJuly 8, 2019\nPage 4\n\nARGUMENT\n\nI. Applicable Law\n\nUnder the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., federal courts are empowered to order a defendant's detention pending trial upon a determination that the defendant is either a danger to the community or a risk of flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (“no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community”). A finding of risk of flight must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). A finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995); Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 405. In addition, a court may also order detention if there is “a serious risk that the [defendant] will . . . attempt to obstruct justice, or . . . to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B); see also United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).\n\nThe Bail Reform Act lists four factors to be considered in the detention analysis: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the person’s “character . . . [and] financial resources”; and (4) the seriousness of the danger posed by the defendant’s release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Evidentiary rules do not apply at detention hearings and the government is entitled to present evidence by way of proffer, among other means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2); see also United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).\n\nWhere a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Additionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E).\n\nII. Discussion\n\nThe defendant should be detained pending trial. For the reasons set forth below, it is difficult to overstate the risk of flight and danger to the community if the defendant is released, and for those reasons, the defendant cannot overcome the statutory presumption in favor of detention in this case.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000346",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11-1 Filed 07/12/19 Page 4 of 10",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Honorable Henry Pitman\nUnited States Magistrate Judge\nJuly 8, 2019\nPage 4",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ARGUMENT",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "I. Applicable Law\n\nUnder the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., federal courts are empowered to order a defendant's detention pending trial upon a determination that the defendant is either a danger to the community or a risk of flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (“no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community”). A finding of risk of flight must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). A finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995); Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 405. In addition, a court may also order detention if there is “a serious risk that the [defendant] will . . . attempt to obstruct justice, or . . . to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B); see also United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).\n\nThe Bail Reform Act lists four factors to be considered in the detention analysis: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the person’s “character . . . [and] financial resources”; and (4) the seriousness of the danger posed by the defendant’s release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Evidentiary rules do not apply at detention hearings and the government is entitled to present evidence by way of proffer, among other means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2); see also United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).\n\nWhere a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Additionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E).",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "II. Discussion\n\nThe defendant should be detained pending trial. For the reasons set forth below, it is difficult to overstate the risk of flight and danger to the community if the defendant is released, and for those reasons, the defendant cannot overcome the statutory presumption in favor of detention in this case.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000346",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Henry Pitman",
      "Jackson",
      "Chimurenga",
      "Ferranti",
      "Friedman",
      "LaFontaine",
      "Martir"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "July 8, 2019",
      "07/12/19"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:19-cr-00490-RMB",
      "11-1",
      "18 U.S.C. §§ 3141",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 1591",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000346"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the applicable law and arguments for detaining the defendant pending trial. The text is well-formatted and clear, with no visible redactions or damage."
}