mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00000933.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "23",
    "document_number": "20-1",
    "date": "04/01/2021",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 21-770, Document 20-1, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page23 of 31\n\nRecognizing this weakness, the Government relies on the statutory maximum penalty to argue that the case is serious and that Ms. Maxwell poses a risk of flight. But the statutory maximum is hardly relevant to determine risk of flight. In the vast majority of federal cases, the statutory maximum penalties are sky-high and are not reflective of the real potential penalties. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1658(b) (statutory maximum of life imprisonment for turning off a light in a lighthouse to expose a ship to danger.\n\nEven if there were evidence to back up the four anonymous accusers, the Second Circuit \"require[s] more than evidence of the commission of a serious crime and the fact of a potential long sentence to support a finding of risk of flight.\" United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d. Cir. 1988) (district court's finding that defendant posed a risk of flight was clearly erroneous, despite potential for \"long sentence of incarceration\"); Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 65, 76-77 (reversing detention order where defendants agreed to significant physical and financial restrictions, despite the fact that they faced a \"lengthy term of incarceration\").\n\n21\nDOJ-OGR-00000933",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-1, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page23 of 31",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Recognizing this weakness, the Government relies on the statutory maximum penalty to argue that the case is serious and that Ms. Maxwell poses a risk of flight. But the statutory maximum is hardly relevant to determine risk of flight. In the vast majority of federal cases, the statutory maximum penalties are sky-high and are not reflective of the real potential penalties. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1658(b) (statutory maximum of life imprisonment for turning off a light in a lighthouse to expose a ship to danger.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Even if there were evidence to back up the four anonymous accusers, the Second Circuit \"require[s] more than evidence of the commission of a serious crime and the fact of a potential long sentence to support a finding of risk of flight.\" United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d. Cir. 1988) (district court's finding that defendant posed a risk of flight was clearly erroneous, despite potential for \"long sentence of incarceration\"); Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 65, 76-77 (reversing detention order where defendants agreed to significant physical and financial restrictions, despite the fact that they faced a \"lengthy term of incarceration\").",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "21",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000933",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/01/2021",
      "1988"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 21-770",
      "Document 20-1",
      "3068530",
      "18 U.S.C. 1658(b)",
      "837 F.2d 48",
      "493 F.3d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000933"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell. The text discusses the government's argument regarding the risk of flight and cites relevant case law. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}