mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003043.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "109",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 109 of 239\n\n2. Maxwell's Fourth Amendment Claim Fails\n\nMaxwell's Fourth Amendment motion is premised on a wholly unsupported expansion of the law. Because Maxwell lacked a privacy interest in the files of a third party law firm who represented her adversary in civil litigation, and because the subpoena was entirely lawful, she cannot make out a Fourth Amendment violation. Moreover, even if Maxwell had standing to assert this claim, it would nonetheless fail because the Government relied in good faith on a judicial order permitting compliance with its subpoena.\n\na. Maxwell Has Not Established Standing\n\ni. Applicable Law\n\nThe Fourth Amendment protects the \"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\" U.S. Const. amend IV. \"The basic purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.\" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \"It has been clear for a generation that 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights . . . [that] may not be vicariously asserted.'\" United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights \"are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party.\" United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is \"whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.\" United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold question involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstrated a subjective",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 109 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2. Maxwell's Fourth Amendment Claim Fails\n\nMaxwell's Fourth Amendment motion is premised on a wholly unsupported expansion of the law. Because Maxwell lacked a privacy interest in the files of a third party law firm who represented her adversary in civil litigation, and because the subpoena was entirely lawful, she cannot make out a Fourth Amendment violation. Moreover, even if Maxwell had standing to assert this claim, it would nonetheless fail because the Government relied in good faith on a judicial order permitting compliance with its subpoena.",
      "position": "top"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "a. Maxwell Has Not Established Standing",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "i. Applicable Law\n\nThe Fourth Amendment protects the \"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\" U.S. Const. amend IV. \"The basic purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.\" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \"It has been clear for a generation that 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights . . . [that] may not be vicariously asserted.'\" United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights \"are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party.\" United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is \"whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.\" United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold question involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstrated a subjective",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "82",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003043",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003043"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, specifically discussing Maxwell's Fourth Amendment claim. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is from a legal proceeding and includes citations to various court cases."
}