mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003080.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "146",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 146 of 239\n\n(Def. Mot. 4, Ex. H at 9). \"That knowledge,\" the Court explained, \"goes directly to the truth or falsity of the alleged defamation, a key element of Plaintiff's claim.\" (Id.). The Court therefore ordered the defendant to answer the questions related to her sexual activity with or involving (1) Epstein, (2) Giuffre, (3) underage girls known to Epstein or who she thought might become known to Epstein, or (4) involving massage with individuals the defendant \"knew to be, or believed might be, known to Epstein.\" (Id. at 10). The Court further ordered the defendant to answer questions about her knowledge of the sexual activities of others in the same four categories. The Court added that the \"scope of Defendant's answers are not bound by time period, though Defendant need not answer questions that relate to none of these subjects or that is clearly not relevant.\" (Id.). The defendant sat for a second deposition on July 22, 2016, before the case settled.\n\nAs discussed more fully below, the Indictment charges the defendant with two counts of perjury, one arising from statements made during the April 2016 deposition and one arising from statements made during the July 2016 deposition. Indictment ¶¶ 21, 23. (Ex. 10 at 253:25-254:8, 384:15-20; Ex. 11 at 88:9-89:13, 91:22-92:16, 113:2-12). The defendant now moves to dismiss both counts, arguing that the Court can effectively decide now, as a matter of law, that the questions were fundamentally ambiguous, her answers were true, and her answers were immaterial to the case.\n\nB. Applicable Law\n\nSection 1623(a) imposes criminal penalties on anyone who \"in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court . . . knowingly makes any false material declaration.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). In perjury prosecutions, \"whether the witness believes that an answer is true or false generally turns on the declarant's understanding of the question.\" United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, and as is true of virtually all factual issues, \"[a] jury is best equipped\n\n119\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003080",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 146 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "(Def. Mot. 4, Ex. H at 9). \"That knowledge,\" the Court explained, \"goes directly to the truth or falsity of the alleged defamation, a key element of Plaintiff's claim.\" (Id.). The Court therefore ordered the defendant to answer the questions related to her sexual activity with or involving (1) Epstein, (2) Giuffre, (3) underage girls known to Epstein or who she thought might become known to Epstein, or (4) involving massage with individuals the defendant \"knew to be, or believed might be, known to Epstein.\" (Id. at 10). The Court further ordered the defendant to answer questions about her knowledge of the sexual activities of others in the same four categories. The Court added that the \"scope of Defendant's answers are not bound by time period, though Defendant need not answer questions that relate to none of these subjects or that is clearly not relevant.\" (Id.). The defendant sat for a second deposition on July 22, 2016, before the case settled.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As discussed more fully below, the Indictment charges the defendant with two counts of perjury, one arising from statements made during the April 2016 deposition and one arising from statements made during the July 2016 deposition. Indictment ¶¶ 21, 23. (Ex. 10 at 253:25-254:8, 384:15-20; Ex. 11 at 88:9-89:13, 91:22-92:16, 113:2-12). The defendant now moves to dismiss both counts, arguing that the Court can effectively decide now, as a matter of law, that the questions were fundamentally ambiguous, her answers were true, and her answers were immaterial to the case.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. Applicable Law",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Section 1623(a) imposes criminal penalties on anyone who \"in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court . . . knowingly makes any false material declaration.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). In perjury prosecutions, \"whether the witness believes that an answer is true or false generally turns on the declarant's understanding of the question.\" United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, and as is true of virtually all factual issues, \"[a] jury is best equipped",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "119",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003080",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein",
      "Giuffre",
      "Lighte"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "April 2016",
      "July 2016",
      "July 22, 2016",
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "18 U.S.C. § 1623(a)",
      "782 F.2d 367",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003080"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a perjury case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}