DOJ-OGR-00003668.json 5.8 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "16 of 22",
  4. "document_number": "206",
  5. "date": "04/16/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 22\noffenses with which Ms. Maxwell is charged do not require the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child.\n\nA. Section 3283 Applies Only to Offenses that Necessarily Entail the Sexual Abuse or Physical Abuse, or Kidnapping, of a Child.\n\nAs demonstrated in Ms. Maxwell's opening brief, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly and consistently that an \"offense\" or \"crime\" that \"involves\" certain conduct means an offense that necessarily entails or requires that conduct. See, e.g., Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 782 (2020) (\"a court should look to the state offense's elements\" rather than case-specific facts); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019) (rejecting argument that \"offense that . . . involves\" provision permitted court to look to case-specific facts, even if necessary to save provision from unconstitutional vagueness); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (interpreting \"offenses that involve fraud or deceit\" to mean \"offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct\") (internal punctuation omitted); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (stating that \"offense that . . . involves\" language \"requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense . . . rather than to the particular facts\" at issue); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 217 n.15, 221 (1953) (limiting extended statute of limitations for \"any offense [] involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States\" to \"offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States is an essential ingredient of the offense charged\"). The government's attempt to limit this clear line of cases is unpersuasive.\n\nThe government claims that a \"necessarily entails\" approach (or, as the government describes it, a \"categorical\" approach) is \"only used in settings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a prior conviction.\" Opp. 39. While one would expect the government to support such a statement with citations to Supreme Court cases\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003668",
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  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 22",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "offenses with which Ms. Maxwell is charged do not require the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child.",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "A. Section 3283 Applies Only to Offenses that Necessarily Entail the Sexual Abuse or Physical Abuse, or Kidnapping, of a Child.",
  25. "position": "top"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "As demonstrated in Ms. Maxwell's opening brief, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly and consistently that an \"offense\" or \"crime\" that \"involves\" certain conduct means an offense that necessarily entails or requires that conduct. See, e.g., Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 782 (2020) (\"a court should look to the state offense's elements\" rather than case-specific facts); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019) (rejecting argument that \"offense that . . . involves\" provision permitted court to look to case-specific facts, even if necessary to save provision from unconstitutional vagueness); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (interpreting \"offenses that involve fraud or deceit\" to mean \"offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct\") (internal punctuation omitted); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (stating that \"offense that . . . involves\" language \"requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense . . . rather than to the particular facts\" at issue); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 217 n.15, 221 (1953) (limiting extended statute of limitations for \"any offense [] involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States\" to \"offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States is an essential ingredient of the offense charged\"). The government's attempt to limit this clear line of cases is unpersuasive.",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "The government claims that a \"necessarily entails\" approach (or, as the government describes it, a \"categorical\" approach) is \"only used in settings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a prior conviction.\" Opp. 39. While one would expect the government to support such a statement with citations to Supreme Court cases",
  35. "position": "middle"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "11",
  40. "position": "footer"
  41. },
  42. {
  43. "type": "printed",
  44. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003668",
  45. "position": "footer"
  46. }
  47. ],
  48. "entities": {
  49. "people": [
  50. "Maxwell",
  51. "Shular",
  52. "Davis",
  53. "Kawashima",
  54. "Holder",
  55. "Leocal",
  56. "Ashcroft",
  57. "Bridges"
  58. ],
  59. "organizations": [
  60. "Supreme Court",
  61. "United States"
  62. ],
  63. "locations": [],
  64. "dates": [
  65. "04/16/21",
  66. "2020",
  67. "2019",
  68. "2012",
  69. "2004",
  70. "1953"
  71. ],
  72. "reference_numbers": [
  73. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  74. "Document 206",
  75. "DOJ-OGR-00003668"
  76. ]
  77. },
  78. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 16 of 22."
  79. }