mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003783.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "9",
    "document_number": "212",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 9 of 20\n\nIn addition to the inapplicability of the third-party doctrine, the government’s response fails to account for two other, dispositive facts proving that Maxwell has a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, the Protective Order by its terms affords Maxwell a reasonable expectation of privacy. Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 3 (defining “CONFIDENTIAL” information as that which “implicates common law and statutory privacy interests of . . . Ghislaine Maxwell” (emphasis added)). What would it say to civil litigants if they could not rely on a court’s promise of confidentiality, at least absent notice and an opportunity to object to any breach of that promise (which, of course, Maxwell was denied here). See Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 14 (precluding modification of the Protective Order absent “good cause shown following notice to all parties and an opportunity for them to be heard”).\n\nSecond, Martindell affords Maxwell a reasonable expectation of privacy. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 294. In Martindell, the Second Circuit held that “the proper procedure” to obtain confidential material under a Protective Order, “as the Government should know, was either to subpoena the deposition transcripts for use in a pending proceeding such as a grand jury investigation or trial, in which the issue could be raised by motion to quash or modify the subpoena, [Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)] or to seek permissive intervention in the private action pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)], for the purpose of obtaining vacation or modification of the protective order.” Id. (emphasis added)). By affording Maxwell a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, Martindell makes clear that, having been denied those rights when the subpoena was first issued, Maxwell has standing to challenge the government’s conduct now. Id.; see Lavender, 583 F.2d at 632.\n\n4\nDOJ-OGR-00003783",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 9 of 20",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In addition to the inapplicability of the third-party doctrine, the government’s response fails to account for two other, dispositive facts proving that Maxwell has a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, the Protective Order by its terms affords Maxwell a reasonable expectation of privacy. Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 3 (defining “CONFIDENTIAL” information as that which “implicates common law and statutory privacy interests of . . . Ghislaine Maxwell” (emphasis added)). What would it say to civil litigants if they could not rely on a court’s promise of confidentiality, at least absent notice and an opportunity to object to any breach of that promise (which, of course, Maxwell was denied here). See Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 14 (precluding modification of the Protective Order absent “good cause shown following notice to all parties and an opportunity for them to be heard”).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, Martindell affords Maxwell a reasonable expectation of privacy. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 294. In Martindell, the Second Circuit held that “the proper procedure” to obtain confidential material under a Protective Order, “as the Government should know, was either to subpoena the deposition transcripts for use in a pending proceeding such as a grand jury investigation or trial, in which the issue could be raised by motion to quash or modify the subpoena, [Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)] or to seek permissive intervention in the private action pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)], for the purpose of obtaining vacation or modification of the protective order.” Id. (emphasis added)). By affording Maxwell a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, Martindell makes clear that, having been denied those rights when the subpoena was first issued, Maxwell has standing to challenge the government’s conduct now. Id.; see Lavender, 583 F.2d at 632.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003783",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ghislaine Maxwell",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 212",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003783",
      "Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 3",
      "Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 14",
      "594 F.2d at 294",
      "583 F.2d at 632"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ghislaine Maxwell. The text discusses the Protective Order and the government's response to it. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}