mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003788.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "14",
    "document_number": "212",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 14 of 20\n\nBut that's doubtless because that law has been clear for forty-two years that the government can modify a civil Protective Order and then subpoena confidential material only after notice to the real party in interest and an opportunity to respond. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 294 (Martindell decided in 1979). The proper procedure for modifying a civil Protective Order at the government's request, in other words, is the one that affords due process. U.S. CONST. amend. V.\n\nThat no case has addressed the remedy for a Martindell violation is evidence only of (1) the government's prior compliance with Martindell (which should, of course, be expected), or (2) a criminal defendant having not raised the issue before. In this case, however, (1) the government violated Martindell, and (2) Maxwell seeks suppression as a sanction.\n\nSuppression is the proper remedy for at least two reasons. First, at its heart, Martindell is grounded in due process principles, and the government's conduct here violated Maxwell's right to due process. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The essence of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard. Martindell guaranteed Maxwell notice and an opportunity to be heard, 594 F.2d at 294, as did the Protective Order, Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 14. But Maxwell had no idea that the Giuffre Protective Order had been modified behind her back until she was indicted and the government disclosed the 90,000 pages of material it obtained from Boies Schiller.2 The government's due process violation warrants suppression. E.g., Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (suppression for due process violation).\n\nSecond, because the government violated Martindell not only by denying Maxwell notice and an opportunity to be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon,\n\n2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the Giuffre action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know the Protective Order was modified.\n\n9\nDOJ-OGR-00003788",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 14 of 20",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "But that's doubtless because that law has been clear for forty-two years that the government can modify a civil Protective Order and then subpoena confidential material only after notice to the real party in interest and an opportunity to respond. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 294 (Martindell decided in 1979). The proper procedure for modifying a civil Protective Order at the government's request, in other words, is the one that affords due process. U.S. CONST. amend. V.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "That no case has addressed the remedy for a Martindell violation is evidence only of (1) the government's prior compliance with Martindell (which should, of course, be expected), or (2) a criminal defendant having not raised the issue before. In this case, however, (1) the government violated Martindell, and (2) Maxwell seeks suppression as a sanction.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Suppression is the proper remedy for at least two reasons. First, at its heart, Martindell is grounded in due process principles, and the government's conduct here violated Maxwell's right to due process. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The essence of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard. Martindell guaranteed Maxwell notice and an opportunity to be heard, 594 F.2d at 294, as did the Protective Order, Mot. 3, Ex. A, ¶ 14. But Maxwell had no idea that the Giuffre Protective Order had been modified behind her back until she was indicted and the government disclosed the 90,000 pages of material it obtained from Boies Schiller.2 The government's due process violation warrants suppression. E.g., Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (suppression for due process violation).",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, because the government violated Martindell not only by denying Maxwell notice and an opportunity to be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon,",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the Giuffre action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know the Protective Order was modified.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003788",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Judge Preska",
      "Judge Sweet",
      "Chief Judge McMahon"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Boies Schiller"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1979",
      "2001"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 212",
      "594 F.2d",
      "257 F.3d 122",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003788"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Maxwell. The text discusses the government's violation of Martindell and the appropriate remedy for this violation. The document includes citations to legal precedents and references to specific court documents."
}