mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00004290.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "25",
    "document_number": "293",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293 Filed 05/25/21 Page 25 of 32\ngovernment. (Dkt. 207 at 9-13). Ms. Maxwell nevertheless preserves her argument and reasserts it with respect to Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment.\nAs it existed in 2004, the federal sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, charged in Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment provided that \"[w]hoever knowingly ... recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a person ... knowing that ... the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act\" is guilty of a crime.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2004). Because the statute uses the phrase \"will be caused\" before the phrase \"to engage in a commercial sex act,\" it is not necessary for the commercial sex act to take place for the crime to be complete. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013) (\"The future verb tense of the phrase 'will be caused'—which precedes 'to engage in a commercial sex act'—indicates that a sex act does not have to occur to satisfy the elements of the child-sex-trafficking offense.\") For the reasons already set forth in Ms. Maxwell's previous motion, the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3283 does not govern 18 U.S.C. § 1591 because the offense does not \"necessarily entail\" the sexual abuse of a minor and therefore is not an \"offense involving\" such conduct. Counts Five and Six must therefore be dismissed.\nIV. The Court Should Dismiss Count Five and Either Count One or Count Three as Multiplicitous.\nCount Five must also be dismissed along with either Count One or Count Three as multiplicitous. In her previous motions, Ms. Maxwell argued that the Court should dismiss either Count One or Count Three of the S1 Indictment as multiplicitous because they charged the same conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. (Dkt. 122, 210). Count Five of the S2 Indictment charges Ms. Maxwell with yet another § 371 conspiracy from 2001-2004 based on the allegations of Accuser-4. (S2 Indictment ¶¶ 22-25). These same allegations are fully\n21\nDOJ-OGR-00004290",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293 Filed 05/25/21 Page 25 of 32",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "government. (Dkt. 207 at 9-13). Ms. Maxwell nevertheless preserves her argument and reasserts it with respect to Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment.\nAs it existed in 2004, the federal sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, charged in Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment provided that \"[w]hoever knowingly ... recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a person ... knowing that ... the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act\" is guilty of a crime.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2004). Because the statute uses the phrase \"will be caused\" before the phrase \"to engage in a commercial sex act,\" it is not necessary for the commercial sex act to take place for the crime to be complete. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013) (\"The future verb tense of the phrase 'will be caused'—which precedes 'to engage in a commercial sex act'—indicates that a sex act does not have to occur to satisfy the elements of the child-sex-trafficking offense.\") For the reasons already set forth in Ms. Maxwell's previous motion, the statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3283 does not govern 18 U.S.C. § 1591 because the offense does not \"necessarily entail\" the sexual abuse of a minor and therefore is not an \"offense involving\" such conduct. Counts Five and Six must therefore be dismissed.",
      "position": "top"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "IV. The Court Should Dismiss Count Five and Either Count One or Count Three as Multiplicitous.\nCount Five must also be dismissed along with either Count One or Count Three as multiplicitous. In her previous motions, Ms. Maxwell argued that the Court should dismiss either Count One or Count Three of the S1 Indictment as multiplicitous because they charged the same conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. (Dkt. 122, 210). Count Five of the S2 Indictment charges Ms. Maxwell with yet another § 371 conspiracy from 2001-2004 based on the allegations of Accuser-4. (S2 Indictment ¶¶ 22-25). These same allegations are fully",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "21",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004290",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Accuser-4",
      "Garcia-Gonzalez"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "2001-2004",
      "05/25/21",
      "2004"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 293",
      "Dkt. 207",
      "Dkt. 122",
      "Dkt. 210",
      "18 U.S.C. § 1591",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3283",
      "18 U.S.C. § 371",
      "714 F.3d 306"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and easy to read."
}